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Andrew Kershen* 
“A motion to [the court’s] discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, 
but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal 
principles.” 




On October 6, 2008, Phillip Martin was found shot to death in his 
kitchen.
2
  The police suspected a drug-related robbery and focused their 
investigation on seventeen-year-old Kelvin H. Gibson, Jr.
3
  The police 
located Gibson and escorted him to the police station, where he was 
interviewed.
4
  Gibson confessed to killing Martin, claiming that others 
had threatened him with death if he did not shoot.
5
  The police stopped 
the interview at that point and administered the Miranda warnings to 
Gibson, which he acknowledged and waived in writing.
6
  The interview 
resumed and continued for several hours.
7
  Gibson gave a second 
interview two days later, again after being read his Miranda rights and 
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The district court held a pre-trial hearing to determine whether 
Gibson’s interviews had been given voluntarily.
9
  Gibson’s attorney 
cross-examined the interviewing detective but did not put on any direct 
evidence.
10
  Gibson himself did not testify.
11
  The prosecution then asked 
for a ruling that Gibson’s interviews had been voluntarily given.
12
  
Gibson’s attorney admitted voluntariness, appending weak caveats: 
“[F]rom the testimony, he gave it voluntarily.  I would note that he was 
17 . . . and . . . that he was very afraid.”
13
  The district court ruled in 
favor of the prosecution and allowed both interviews to be admitted.
14
 
Several months later but still before trial, Gibson’s attorney moved 
for the court to reconsider its ruling.
15
  The motion alleged that Gibson 
had been unable to understand his Miranda rights during the initial 
interview because of marijuana intoxication.
16
  The district court did not 
respond.
17
  Several more months later, Gibson filed a pro se motion to 
reconsider.
18
  His motion alleged coercion because of his age at the time, 
because he was greatly intimidated, and because he was intoxicated.
19
  
The district court allowed argument on the motion the morning of trial.
20
  
Gibson’s attorney presented no new evidence, and the court denied 
Gibson’s pro se motion “for the same reasons mentioned at the first prior 
hearing.”
21
  In a final effort, Gibson’s attorney asked the court to put 
Gibson under oath and allow testimony on the record.
22
  The court 
refused, stating that Gibson already had “every opportunity to raise 
anything” bearing on the voluntariness of his statements.
23
 
                                                          
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 393–394 (alteration in original). 
 14.  Id. at 394. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id.  Gibson’s pro se motion was titled “First Amended Motion to Suppress Statement.”  Id.  
In this Comment, any motion requesting that the district court overturn its final suppression ruling is 
a motion to reconsider.  See Ten Eyck v. Harp, 419 P.2d 922, 925 (Kan. 1966) (holding that the 
nature of a pleading is found in the relief sought, not the form or name given to the paper). 
 19.  Gibson, 322 P.3d at 394. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
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The court’s suppression ruling remained undisturbed.  The 
statements were admitted for use at trial.  Gibson was found guilty of 
first-degree murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.
24 
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed Gibson’s convictions in April 
2014.
25
  In doing so, the court asked “whether the district court properly 
refused to reconsider its prior determination that the statements were 
voluntary.”
26
  To answer this question, the court stated affirmatively for 
the first time that the district court’s refusal to reconsider its judgment on 
a suppression hearing would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
27
  
The court then described the three categories within which an abuse of 
discretion, generally, can occur: 
An abuse of discretion occurs when judicial action was (1) arbitrary, 
fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken 
the view adopted by the trial court; (2) based on an error of law, i.e., if 
the discretion was guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) 
based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does 
not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law 
or the exercise of discretion was based.
28
 
After examining Gibson’s motion and the evidence available to the 
district court, the court held that “a reasonable person could agree with 
the district court’s decision” to refuse Gibson’s proffer of testimony.
29
  
Therefore, the trial court had not abused its discretion. 
Gibson settled a previously unsettled question in Kansas: what 
standard of review does the reviewing court use when examining a 
district court’s grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration of 
judgment on the suppression of evidence?  The reviewing court will use 
an abuse-of-discretion standard.  But how should the district court act 
when presented with a motion to reconsider its previous ruling on 
evidence suppression? 
The Gibson court admonished district courts to refrain from making 
                                                          
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 392. 
 26.  Id. at 398. 
 27.  Id.  The Kansas Supreme Court had previously held that reconsideration of a suppression 
ruling was within the trial court’s discretion.  State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406, 420 (Kan. 2004). 
 28.  Gibson, 322 P.3d at 398 (citing State v. McCullough, 270 P.3d 1142, 1154 (Kan. 2012)). 
 29.  Id. at 400.  The Kansas Supreme Court appears to have implicitly dismissed the error-of-
law and error-of-fact prongs of the abuse-of-discretion standard and gone straight to arbitrary or 
unreasonable. 
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decisions based on legal or factual errors and to decide reasonably.  But 
are there interests to be balanced?  What factors should the district court 
examine?  Should some motions be granted or denied outright without a 
hearing?  In other words, when does a district court make a reasonable 
decision (or at least avoid making an unreasonable ruling)?  This 
Comment presents answers to help district courts exercise discretion 
without abusing their discretion.  Prescribing standards more specific 
than those stated in Gibson may save judicial resources by streamlining 
procedures and reducing the chance of a reversal.  Furthermore, 
consistency across districts enhances at least the appearance, and 
probably the actuality, of the impartial application of justice. 
To be clear on procedure and terminology, this Comment 
encompasses all motions requesting a district court to reverse its own 
pre-trial suppression ruling.  Although such a motion can arise at trial, 
the contemporaneous objection is not discussed because its role is largely 
to preserve an issue for later appeal.
30
  A district court should always 
consider a motion, at least to the extent of accepting and reading the 
filing.  The discretionary choices available are to summarily dismiss the 
motion, to grant the motion without a hearing but allowing for opposing 
briefs, or to reopen the suppression hearing for additional argument and 
evidence.  The process of selecting from these choices is called 
reconsideration in this Comment.  Thus, a “motion to reconsider” 
includes motions that request reconsideration, supplementation, or 
reopening. 
Part II of this Comment discusses judicial discretion and appellate 
review, the purposes and processes of evidence suppression, and relevant 
Kansas statutory authority.  In Part III, a framework for district-court 
analysis is assembled by defining the interests and stakeholders involved, 
by searching for circumstances that may prevent a district court from 
having discretion at all, and by suggesting specific factors for 
consideration when the court does exercise its discretion.  Finally, Part 
IV recommends a four-step procedure that district courts can use to 
determine whether to grant a motion to reconsider based on the facts and 
circumstances presented: (1) does the motion argue a new legal theory?  
If so, deny.  This argument has been waived.  Otherwise, (2) does the 
motion correctly reveal an error of fact or an error of law?  If so, grant.  
A court should correct its own error when possible.  Otherwise, (3) does 
                                                          
 30.  FED. R. EVID. 103; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-404 (2005); see generally, DENNIS D. PRATER 
ET AL., EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD ch. 2 (4th ed. 2011). 
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the motion proffer sufficient relevant and material additional evidence?  
If not, deny.  The motion is repetitive or irrelevant.  Otherwise, (4) 
consider the new evidence in light of a balance of several interests, 
taking into account a nonexclusive list of specific factors.  This stepwise 
procedure ensures a district court uses appropriate process in arriving at 
its substantive discretionary decision. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Judicial Discretion 
The basic concept underlying discretion is choice: a decision maker 
selecting an outcome.
31
  In judicial discretion, the decision maker is a 
judge.  The goal of this Comment is to aid a district court judge’s choice 
by recommending standards and procedures.  To do so, the what of 
judicial discretion will be examined in some detail.  But first, the why of 
judicial discretion merits a brief discussion.  Professor Maurice 
Rosenberg’s foundational articles on judicial discretion illuminate both 
concepts. 
1. The Why of Judicial Discretion 
Professor Rosenberg describes two types of discretion.  The first he 
calls “decision-liberating.”
32
  Decision-liberating discretion allows a 
court free rein to choose a legal outcome.
33
  “Precise norms are not laid 
down, decision is intended to pivot on the circumstances of the particular 
case, and each court along the route is free to reach an independent 
conclusion as to the result called for by its own sound exercise of 
discretion.”
34
  The second category of discretion is “review-limiting.”
35
  
This category of discretion becomes apparent only when viewing the 
hierarchical relationship between courts.
36
  Review-limiting discretion 
grants the district court “a limited right to be wrong . . . without being 
reversed.”
37
  The majority of this Comment takes the point of view of the 
                                                          
 31.  Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636 (1971) [hereinafter Judicial Discretion]. 
 32.  Id. at 638. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 649 (quoting Bringhurst v. Harkins, 122 A. 783, 787 (Del. 1923)). 
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district court and is therefore concerned with decision-liberating 
discretion.  It does, however, bear considering why our judicial system 
allows the “wrong” judgment of a lower court to be undisturbed. 
The most compelling reason for a reviewing court to leave the 
district court’s choice undisturbed is “the superiority of [the court’s] 
nether position.”
38
  The district court judge has the benefit of watching 
the demeanor of litigants and witnesses, seeing and hearing proffered 
evidence and testimony, and observing confusion or hesitation of jurors.  
Just as the rules of evidence favor testimony from witnesses with 
personal knowledge of events,
39
 the reviewing court may rightly prefer 
conclusions drawn from the district court’s full-sense experience to its 
own conclusions drawn from a paper record.  Deference, then, is proper 
for any ruling “based on facts or circumstances that are critical to 
decision and that the record imperfectly conveys.”
40
 
A secondary reason for leaving a district court’s decision undisturbed 
is precisely decision-liberating discretion: the issue is not appropriate for 
a judicially created rule because it resists generalization.
41
  This could be 
because the matter is highly variable—the allowable scope of cross-
examination, for instance—or because the matter arises in a new and 
untested context.
42
  In either case, the reviewing court may not want to 
pass down a rule of law that will poorly fit the next occurrence of the 
same issue. 
Professor Rosenberg contrasts these “good” reasons for allowing 
discretion with three “lesser” reasons: the practical necessities of judicial 
economy and finality and the maintenance of a trial-judge’s morale.
43
  
These reasons are lesser because they apply equally to all district court 
decisions that can be reviewed; they do not discriminate.
44
  The good 
reasons, on the other hand, distinguish those rulings that deserve 
deferential review.
45
  A district court should be granted discretion to rule 
on matters that are best perceived in person or matters that are not 
presently amenable to broad rules of law.  In those cases, the reviewing 
court will not reverse a ruling without a showing of unreasonableness, an 
                                                          
 38.  Id. at 663. 
 39.  FED. R. EVID. 701; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-419 (2005). 
 40.  Judicial Discretion, supra note 31, at 664. 
 41.  Id. at 662. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 660–62. 
 44.  Id. at 662. 
 45.  Id. at 663, 665. 
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error of law, or an error of fact. 
The Kansas Supreme Court deployed this analysis in State v. Reid 
when refining its test for the admissibility of prior crimes and civil 
wrongs under Kansas Statutes Annotated (K.S.A.) section 60-455.
46
  
Section 60-455 bars evidence that would show only a criminal 
disposition;
47
 the statute, however, allows evidence that would “prove 
some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident.”
48
  
The statute also grants the defendant a chance to object to the evidence 
before trial.
49
  If the defendant does object, the district court must use a 
multi-step test to determine admissibility, the first two steps of which are 




These two closely linked determinations are reviewed under different 
standards because of the nature of the issues.  To find materiality, the 
district court has only to determine whether the fact to be proved was 
significant to the statutory elements of the underlying charge.
51
  A piece 
of evidence is immaterial only when it cannot legally affect the 
outcome.
52
  A reviewing court can determine this from the appellate 
record and the statutory charge, and so “materiality is largely a question 
of law.”
53
  The issue of probativeness, that is, whether the evidence 
offered has a tendency to prove or disprove the material fact, is not so 
straightforward.  “[Probativeness] is more a matter of logic and 
experience than of law.”
54
  The Reid court therefore determined that 
materiality would be reviewed de novo and probativeness would be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
55
 
Examined within Professor Rosenberg’s “good reasons” framework, 
it is hardly surprising the Gibson court held that a district court’s ruling 
on a motion to reconsider would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
                                                          
 46.  See State v. Reid, 186 P.3d 713, 718 (Kan. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (Supp. 
2014); see also State v. Gunby, 144 P.3d 647 (Kan. 2006). 
 47.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455(a). 
 48.  Id. § 60-455(b). 
 49.  Id. § 60-455(e). 
 50.  Reid, 186 P.3d at 721 (describing the Gunby test for admissibility of K.S.A. section 60-455 
evidence); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455(b). 
 51.  Reid, 186 P.3d at 723. 
 52.  See id. at 723 (citing Arlio v. Lively, 474 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 53.  Id. at 722. 
 54.  Id. at 724 (quoting State v. Faulkner, 551 P.2d 1247, 1251 (Kan. 1976)). 
 55.  Id. at 722, 724. 
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The district court, having already ruled on suppression, is familiar with 
the evidence and the parties.  The determination is particular to the facts 
and circumstances of each case.  From the perspective of a higher court, 
it would not make sense to substitute its judgment for that of the district 
court.  This is the essence of review-limiting discretion.  The district 
court’s perspective is discussed next. 
2. The What of Judicial Discretion 
After Gibson, district courts in Kansas have broad decision-liberating 
discretion.  No rules yet determine whether a district court has abused its 
discretion except general admonitions that the district court (1) cannot 
decide in an arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable manner; (2) cannot 
decide based on an error of law; and (3) cannot decide based on an error 
of fact.
56
  The latter two abuses of discretion, errors of law and fact, 
define themselves.  A court’s ruling must be reversed because the court 
simply misunderstood the factual foundation or legal landscape.
57
  The 
“arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable” abuse of discretion—equivalent to 
the “no reasonable person would agree” articulation—deserves further 
discussion.  As it turns out, the idea of an “unreasonable” abuse of 
discretion is bound to the idea of decision-liberating discretion. 
Because decision-liberating discretion allows a district court to freely 
select from available outcomes, it is in tension with a basic tenet of our 
judicial system: “It is the essence of all law that when the facts are the 
same, the result is the same.”
58
  Legal rules and precedent conflict with 
decision-liberating discretion.
59
  A prior ruling stating the proposition “if 
X, then Y” necessarily limits a decision maker’s future choice.  Free 
choice gives way to consistency and predictability. 
Thus decision-liberating discretion is not boundless or, at least, does 
not remain boundless for long.  When an appellate court first reviews a 
legal question, it is apt to be deferential to the district court’s decision.
60
  
But over time as the same legal question arises in different contexts, the 
appellate court may narrow the scope of discretion negatively by finding 
                                                          
 56.  See State v. Gibson, 322 P.3d 389, 398 (Kan. 2014) (citing State v. McCullough, 270 P.3d 
1142, 1154 (Kan. 2012)). 
 57.  See infra Parts III.B.1 & 2 for more on errors of fact and law. 
 58.  Judicial Discretion, supra note 31, at 643 (quoting Hubbard v. Hubbard, 58 A. 969, 970 
(Vt. 1904)). 
 59.  Id. at 639. 
 60.  Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 
2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 50 (2000). 
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instances when district courts have abused their discretion.
61
  Factors to 
consider and interests to balance gradually emerge that limit a district 
court’s choice.  Judicial discretion, as to specific factual situations, may 
eventually be replaced altogether by a rule of law.
62 
Professor Rosenberg analogizes the gradual limitation of decision-
liberating choice to a pastoral context: 
The area of discretion is a pasture in which the trial judge is free to 
graze.  The appellate courts will not disturb the trial court’s rulings—
depending on the gradation of discretion that applies to the particular 
instance—but will defer to them.  Every now and again, however, a 
case . . . comes along, and even though it involves an area normally 
entrusted to trial court discretion, the appellate court calls a halt and 
cuts away a corner of the pasture.  From that point on, it has become a 
rule of law . . . .  The result is that a corner of the pasture has been 
fenced off and placed outside the trial judge’s discretion. In other areas 
of the pasture, the trial judge remains free to exercise discretion.
63
 
Within the remaining pasture, the district court retains free choice and 
the limited right to be wrong; when the district court strays from the 
pasture, however, it has acted in an “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable” 
manner and will be reversed on appeal. 
A fenced off portion of the pasture may be defined by “particular 
required factors” that a district court must consider when making its 
decision.
64
  The particular required factors may be set by statute
65
 or by 
judicial decision.
66
  In State v. Murdock, for example, the Kansas 
Supreme Court recognized a need to fence off part of the discretionary 
pasture regarding a ruling on motion to reopen a party’s case after the 
party has rested: 
Yet while examination of our previously decided cases confirms that 
we review a court’s decision on a motion to reopen for an abuse of 
discretion, our past decisions have not sufficiently identified those 
factors which should guide the district court in its determination of 
                                                          
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 180 
(1978). 
 64.  Kan. Dep’t of Revenue v. Powell, 232 P.3d 856, 860 (Kan. 2010). 
 65.  E.g., State v. Edgar, 127 P.3d 986, 992–93 (Kan. 2006) (holding that a trial court 
considering a plea withdrawal must evaluate the standards articulated in the relevant statute). 
 66.  E.g., State v. Murdock, 187 P.3d 1267, 1275–76 (Kan. 2008). 
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whether to permit either party to reopen its case.
67
 
The court did so by prescribing the required factors that go into a 
reasonable discretionary decision: “In exercising its discretion, the court 
must consider the timeliness of the motion, the character of the 
testimony, and the effect of the granting of the motion.  The party 
moving to reopen should provide a reasonable explanation for failure to 
present the evidence in its case-in-chief.”
68
 
Required factors are not elements to be checked off; nor are they to 
be matched one against another, with opposing factors cancelling each 
other out.  Instead, the district court should weigh each factor 
individually and make a reasoned decision in light of the facts and 
circumstances presented by the case.
69
  The district court need not 
consider each factor explicitly, but the court’s record must be sufficiently 




One might question the goal of this Comment: if the process of 
narrowing decision-liberating choice occurs naturally over time, why not 
let the process occur?  First, although Gibson is a recent decision, the 
question of whether to reconsider is recurrent and longstanding.  
Suppression hearings are common pre-trial hearings.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court has examined the issue of reconsideration in cases going 
back at least to 1973.
71
  Second, courts in other jurisdictions have 
analyzed the issue extensively.
72
  The reasoning and holdings from other 
courts can be looked to as a sound foundation to build upon.  Third, a 
consistent jurisdiction-wide set of factors will increase judicial efficiency 
because fewer decisions will be reversed.  And finally, a standard, 
repeatable procedure may make the substantive outcome on a motion to 
reconsider more palatable to defendants and the public.  Whether a piece 
of evidence is suppressed, after all, may determine whether the defendant 
is convicted or acquitted. 
                                                          
 67.  Murdock, 187 P.3d at 1275. 
 68.  Id. (quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 69.  See id. at 1277. 
 70.  Id. (identifying each of the Kansas Supreme Court’s newly announced required factors in 
the district court record). 
 71.  State v. Jackson, 515 P.2d 1108 (Kan. 1973). 
 72.  See infra Part III. 
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B. Suppression of Evidence and Statements 
Evidence—in this Comment, meaning both physical evidence and a 
defendant’s statements—gathered in violation of the defendant’s rights 
may be suppressed, that is, ruled inadmissible for trial.  Typically alleged 
violations are illegal searches and seizures
73
 and involuntary confessions 
or admissions.
74
  Common to all the types of alleged violations is the 
actual court procedure of suppression.
75
  A pre-trial hearing is held at 
which the prosecution and defendant may produce evidence, put on 
witnesses, and cross-examine opposing witnesses.
76
  The district court 
then rules on whether the evidence will be admissible.  This is a critical 
part of a criminal trial.  The evidence in question may be the only direct 
proof of a crime.
77 
A district court suppresses evidence for very different reasons than 
those by which evidence is generally determined inadmissible at trial.  
For instance, a district court may deem character or propensity evidence 
inadmissible because it is immaterial or only marginally relevant to the 
crime charged.
78
  The rules on admissibility of hearsay evidence largely 
address concerns of the reliability of such evidence.
79
  And all evidence 
may be ruled inadmissible, in the discretion of the district court, when its 
probative value is outweighed substantially by a risk of unfair prejudice 
to the opposing party.
80
  In contrast, evidence gathered in violation of a 
defendant’s rights is likely to be highly relevant, reliable, and probative 
of guilt: “It is true that . . . the effect of the rule is to deprive the courts of 
extremely relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of the defendant.”
81
 
                                                          
 73.  See U.S.  CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 74.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see U.S.  CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 75.  WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS & CONFESSIONS § 30:1 (2d ed. 
1980). 
 76.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
11.2(d) (5th ed. 2012); RINGEL, supra note 75, § 20:15. 
 77.  See, e.g., State v. Riedel, 752 P.2d 115, 117 (Kan. 1988) (“[T]he State candidly conceded 
its case against defendant, without evidence of the prior conviction, was too weak to justify going to 
trial.”). 
 78.  See FED. R. EVID. 405; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (Supp. 2014); see also supra notes 46–
55 and accompanying text; see generally PRATER, supra note 30, at ch. 6. 
 79.  See generally PRATER, supra note 30, chs. 10–13; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-459–460 (2005 
& Supp. 2014). 
 80.  FED. R. EVID. 403; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (2005). 
 81.  Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and 
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1392 
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The suppression of evidence is the result of a balance between 
societal costs and benefits—a balance the district court is charged with 
assessing.  The cost of suppressing relevant, reliable, and probative 
evidence is clear: “[S]ome guilty defendants may go free or receive 
reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains.”
82
  The benefit 
is more difficult to articulate, partly because the United States Supreme 
Court has not always been clear on what exactly society gets out of 
suppression.
83
  In modern decisions, however the Court has been clear 
that deterrence of future police misconduct is the primary—possibly the 
only—benefit society derives from the suppression of evidence.
84
  The 
idea is that excluding relevant, probative evidence in one case will set an 
example, discouraging police from gathering evidence outside of 
constitutional bounds in later investigations.
85
  Courts therefore must 
weigh the benefit of probable, expected deterrence against the cost to 
public safety in different factual scenarios.
86
  As might be inferred from 
the adjectives modifying deterrence, the U.S. Supreme Court has often 
held that the societal cost outweighed the benefit.
87
  Thus, suppression 
rules have become subject to complex, situation-specific exceptions.
88
  
Some broad strokes, however, may be stated about what sorts of 
evidence are relatively more often suppressed, which correlates with 
what constitutional rights are relatively more often protected. 
Physical evidence is generally more admissible than incriminating 
statements by the defendant, even when a constitutional violation can be 
shown.  Evidence gathered by an illegal search or seizure may still be 
                                                          
(1983).  Although retired Justice Stewart wrote directly about the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule, his words are applicable to evidence suppressed on the basis of other constitutional violations. 
 82.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). 
 83.  Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion—a Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1275, 1298–1302 (2000) (describing the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rationale for 
deterrence). 
 84.  E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 900 (“[W]e must consider once again the tension between the 
sometimes competing goals of . . . deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to 
unreasonable invasions of privacy and . . . establishing procedures under which criminal defendants 
are ‘acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.’” (quoting 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969))); LAFAVE, supra  note 76, § 1.1(f); Davies, 
supra note 83, at 1299 (“For the past two decades, the Supreme Court has justified the exclusion of 
probative but tainted evidence almost exclusively on the ground of deterrence.”). 
 85.  LAFAVE, supra  note 76, § 1.1(f). 
 86.  Id.; e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 87.  E.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (holding that evidence gathered illegally, but in good-faith 
reliance on a search warrant later discovered to be defective, should not be suppressed because it 
does not further deterrence). 
 88.  LAFAVE, supra note 76, § 1.1(f). 
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used at trial under two well-established exceptions.
89
  Furthermore, such 
evidence can be used at many adjudicatory proceedings other than the 
actual criminal trial.
90
  Statements or confessions found to be involuntary 
because of a Fifth Amendment due-process violation, on the other hand, 
will be suppressed.
91
  There are no allowable exceptions.
92
  The Miranda 
warnings, recommended to preserve the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self incrimination,
93
 sit in a middle ground: statements given 
without the warnings will be suppressed, but the fruits, that is, evidence 
derived from involuntary statements, are admissible.
94
  Admissible fruits 
may include incriminating statements made by parties other than the 
defendant because that would not be self-incrimination.
95
  In contrast to 
the Miranda framework, the fruits of evidence gathered in violation of 




Why the U.S. Supreme Court does not treat all illegally gathered 
evidence the same is not clear.  It may be that the Court distinguishes 
between accomplished wrongs and threatened wrongs.
97
  An illegal 
search or seizure, in the Court’s view, is “‘fully accomplished’ by the 
unlawful search or seizure itself.”
98
  If the use of that evidence “work[s] 
no new Fourth Amendment wrong,” then suppression serves only as a 
deterrent for future cases.
99
  The use at trial of an involuntary statement, 
however, is an impending wrong.
100
  By suppressing the defendant’s 
incriminating statement, compelled self-incrimination is avoided.  It may 
also be that the Court distinguishes between a violation of property rights 
                                                          
 89.  Id. at §§ 1.3, 11.4(a) (describing the good-faith and inevitable-discovery exceptions). 
 90.  Davies, supra note 83, at 1303 (listing “grand jury proceedings, civil tax proceedings, civil 
deportation proceedings, child protection proceedings, military discharge proceedings, parole and 
probation revocation proceedings, supervised release proceedings, habeas corpus proceedings, and 
sentencing proceedings”). 
 91.  Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385–86 (1964); RINGEL, supra note 75, § 30:2. 
 92.  But see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 303 (1991) (holding that mistaken admission 
of an involuntary confession may be harmless error). 
 93.  RINGEL, supra note 75, § 24:3. 
 94.  Id., at § 30:8. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  There are two significant exceptions that fruits may be admitted under.  LAFAVE, supra 
note 76, at §11.4(a) (describing the independent-source and attenuation exceptions). 
 97.  William C. Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 
1193, 1196–1206 (1989). 
 98.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 354 (1974)). 
 99.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354). 
 100.  Heffernan, supra note 97, at 1198–1200. 
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and a violation of bodily integrity.  Although the Court has clearly stated 
that a constitutional violation does not give a defendant a personal right 
of redress,
101
 the Court has also recognized that involuntary statements 
may be the result of physical or mental coercion.
102
  Violence against a 
person is perhaps more worthy of deterrence than violation of a property 
or privacy right.  Finally, the Miranda warnings are mere procedural 
guarantees of voluntary statements and are not in themselves mandated 
by the Constitution.
103 
In summary, although each suppression ruling will be specific to the 
facts and circumstances of its case, the Court’s decisions are generally 
less permissive to the admissibility of a defendant’s own statements 
compared with the admissibility of physical evidence and other 
witnesses’ statements.  Although a district court should suppress 
evidence only when a constitutional violation has actually occurred, a 
baseline distinction may be made depending on what type of violation is 
alleged.  Furthermore, a baseline distinction may be found in the 
positions of the defendant and prosecution. 
C. How Kansas Statutes Position the Prosecution and Defendant 
Kansas has codified a defendant’s right to object before trial to 
illegally gathered evidence.
104
  The Kansas statutory procedures stand in 
for the judicially created processes applied to the states by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
105
  The statutory hearings allow a defendant to raise 
objections to evidence on constitutional grounds.  The two statutes are 
materially similar to one another except for the issue raised: suppression 
of involuntary statements or suppression of illegally seized evidence.  
The defendant has an initial burden to allege a prima facie rights 
violation.
106
  When defendant’s motion suffices, the district court shall 
hold a hearing at which the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to 
show that a violation did not occur.
107
  Both statutes also recognize that 
the prosecution and defendant are not similarly situated. 
                                                          
 101.  See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (“The rule thus operates as ‘a judicially created remedy . . . 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’” (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
348)). 
 102.  RINGEL, supra note 75, § 24:2. 
 103.  Id. at § 24:3. 
 104.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3215, 3216 (2007). 
 105.  State v. Miles, 662 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Kan. 1983). 
 106.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3215(2), 3216(2). 
 107.  Id. §§ 22-3215(3), (4), 3216(2). 
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First, the statutes recognize a disparity in information between 
defendant and prosecution.  The motion must be made before trial 
“unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware 
of the ground for the motion.”
108
  Furthermore, the district court always 
retains discretion to hear a motion at trial regardless of circumstances.
109
  
These provisions implicitly acknowledge that the defendant is 
disadvantaged compared to the prosecution.  The basis for a suppression 
motion is police action, and a defendant may simply not know all the 
details until they come out at trial.  The prosecution, however, is 
assumed to have full knowledge, and the statutes do not generally allow 
the prosecution to raise the issue at trial.
110 
The prosecution, on the other hand, has a procedural option not 
available to the defendant.  The prosecution may, within fourteen days of 
entry of judgment, make an interlocutory appeal to the appellate court.
111
  
This stays trial proceedings until the issue is determined on appeal.
112
  
The interlocutory appeal seems to recognize the critical importance to the 
prosecution’s case of suppressed evidence.  The interlocutory appeal, 
however, will submit only evidence contained within the suppression-
hearing record to the appellate court.  Because the prosecution will not 
be able to supplement the record, this option will not always be 
attractive.  When the prosecution needs to put on additional evidence, its 
only option is a motion for reconsideration.  Because the defendant may 
not make an interlocutory appeal, the defendant’s only immediate 
“appeal” of an adverse ruling is also a motion for reconsideration. 
Once a district court has ruled on a motion to suppress evidence, a 
party is able to move the court for reconsideration, although on what 
statutory authority is not entirely clear.  The Kansas Supreme Court has 
interpreted K.S.A. section 22-3216(3)
113
 to allow a district court to re-
entertain an illegal-seizure suppression motion at trial.
114
  The Kansas 
Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]o interpret otherwise would be to 
                                                          
 108.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3215(6), 3216(3). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  For tactical reasons the prosecution may ask the court to rule on admissibility of evidence 
before trial.  See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 322 P.3d 389, 392 (Kan. 2014). 
 111.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3603 (Supp. 2014). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. § 22-3216(3) (“The motion shall be made before trial, in the court having jurisdiction to 
try the case, unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the ground 
for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 114.  State v. Jackson, 515 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Kan. 1973). 
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proscribe correction of its own error by the trial court at trial.”
115
  
Because K.S.A. section 22-3215(6), regarding motions to suppress 
involuntary statements, contains nearly identical language,
116
 it may be 
presumed that this statute identically allows a district court to re-entertain 
an involuntary-statement suppression motion at trial.  Case law has not 
specifically addressed under what authority a district court may hear a 
motion to reconsider evidence suppression after the entry of judgment 
but before the trial.  However, the Kansas Supreme Court’s broad 
statements about a district court’s discretion to reconsider its own 




Kansas codification of suppression procedures recognize that the 
defendant and prosecution are not similarly situated.  U.S. Supreme 
Court opinions indicate that not all constitutional violations are equal.  
And a district court’s freedom to interpret these opinions will likely be 
channeled over time.  This Comment now attempts to detect the contours 
of that channel. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In this Part, a framework for a district court’s discretionary decision-
making is erected. First, the three broad interests are identified that a 
district court may balance when making its decision on a motion to 
reconsider a prior judgment on the suppression of evidence.  Second, this 
Part probes the boundaries of discretion, looking for fenced-off portions 
of the pasture.  Finally, this Part suggests specific factors a district court 
should consider in making its decision.  Each specific factor is discussed 
in the context of the broad interests identified. 
A. Interests at Stake 
Three broad interests are at stake in a district court’s discretionary 
decision to reconsider an evidence-suppression ruling.  The first is 
                                                          
 115.  Id. 
 116.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3215(6) (2007) (“The motion shall be made before preliminary 
examination or trial, unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the 
ground for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the preliminary 
examination or the trial.”). 
 117.  State v. Riedel, 752 P.2d 115, 118 (Kan. 1988) (“[R]econsideration of [an evidentiary] 
issue lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”). 
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society’s interest in an accurate ruling on all the evidence.
118
  Second is 
the district court’s own interest in judicial economy: “controlling its 
docket and avoiding piecemeal litigation.”
119
  Third is the threat of unfair 
prejudice to the nonmoving party, that is, the party in whose favor the 
district court has already ruled.
120
  These interests are not presented in 
hierarchical order.  In fact, the Federal Circuit Courts disagree over the 
relative weight that should be allocated to each interest. 
1. Society’s Interest in an Accurate Determination 
When a defendant’s rights have been violated, the evidence should 
be suppressed;
121
 when a defendant’s rights have not been violated, the 
evidence should be admitted.  These straightforward propositions are the 
basis for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s statement in United 
States v. Ozuna that “society has a strong interest in admitting all 
relevant evidence.”
122
  In Ozuna, the district court granted defendant’s 
suppression motion because of perceived discrepancies in defendant’s 
signature on a consent-to-search form.
123
  The prosecution later 
submitted the form to a handwriting expert and moved to reopen the 
hearing to admit the expert testimony.
124
  The court granted the motion 
and, after hearing from handwriting experts for both prosecution and 
defense, reversed its ruling and admitted the evidence.
125 
In affirming the district court’s discretionary decision, the Ozuna 
court weighed all three of the interests this Comment will discuss.  The 
district court had not abused its discretion because (a) the additional 
evidence allowed the court to make a more accurate ruling on the 
suppression motion; (b) there was no evidence of negligence or 
deliberate delay by the prosecution; and (c) the decision to reopen did not 
unfairly prejudice the defendant, who was given adequate time to prepare 
and to hire his own expert.
126
  The Ozuna court’s analysis, however, 
                                                          
 118.  United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 734, 736 (7th Cir. 2009); accord United States v. 
Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 679 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 119.  Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 679; accord Ozuna, 561 F.3d at 735. 
 120.  United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 121.  This statement is far from straightforward.  See supra notes 81–102 and accompanying 
text. 
 122.  Ozuna, 561 F.3d at 734. 
 123.  Id. at 731–32. 
 124.  Id. at 732. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 735–36. 
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appears to gloss over a difference between two possible meanings of 
“society’s interest.”  Does society’s interest lie in the admission of all 
relevant evidence to make an accurate determination on suppression or in 
the judgment at trial? 
The Ozuna court first stated that, “society has a strong interest in 
admitting all relevant evidence. Thus, a defendant is entitled to 
suppression only in cases of constitutional violations, and the district 
court remains free throughout the trial to reconsider its previous orders 
suppressing evidence.”
127
  This statement seems to mean that society’s 
interest lies in making an accurate determination of whether a 
constitutional violation occurred.  But later, the court stated that “a more 
flexible approach protects society’s interest in ensuring a complete 
proceeding where the court considers all relevant, constitutionally 
obtained evidence.”
128
  This statement echoes the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
balancing of society’s interest against deterrence for whether evidence in 
particular situations should be suppressed at all.
129
 
Distinguishing precisely where society’s interest lies on a motion to 
reconsider is important.  For, if society’s interest lies in the most accurate 
determination at trial, then society’s interest will always align with the 
prosecution and against the defendant.  Society’s interest is in favor of 
admitting “extremely relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of the 
defendant.”
130
  If the district court has ruled against the prosecution, 
society’s interest will weigh in favor of allowing the prosecution to 
supplement because society wants that evidence at trial.  If the district 
court has ruled against the defendant, society’s interest likely weighs 
against reconsideration for the same reason.  Society’s interest on the 
outcome at trial has nothing to do with determining whether a 
defendant’s rights were violated. 
This interpretation of society’s interest puts the cart before the horse.  
It conflicts with its premises: that evidence should be suppressed when a 
constitutional violation has occurred and should not be suppressed 
otherwise.  At this stage of the proceedings, the district court needs to 
accurately determine whether a constitutional violation occurred.  A 
better interpretation, one more consistent with the premises, is that 
society’s interest on a motion to reconsider favors an accurate 
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 734 (citations omitted). 
 128.  Id. at 735. 
 129.  See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). 
 130.  Stewart, supra note 81, at 1392. 
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determination on suppression.  Therefore, society’s interest weighs in 
favor of the district court reconsidering its decision when the movant 
submits additional relevant information, regardless of whether the 
movant is prosecution or defendant. 
The relative weight accorded to society’s interest, however, may 
increase or decrease depending on which party is the movant and the 
nature of the claim.  Suppression of physical evidence is relatively 
disfavored when compared with suppression of involuntary statements.
131
  
Although society’s interest in an accurate suppression ruling will often 
weigh in favor of reconsideration, that weight will be relatively greater in 
two cases: (1) when the underlying issue is the legality of a search or 
seizure and the movant is the prosecution; and (2) when the underlying 
issue is the voluntariness of a statement and the movant is the defendant.  
Society’s interest carries relatively less weight in the opposite 
circumstances. 
2. The Court’s Interest in Judicial Economy 
While society’s interest in an accurate determination usually weighs 
in favor of reconsideration, the court’s interest in judicial economy will 
frequently weigh against reconsideration.  Judicial economy is the 
avoidance of waste or delay.  “[T]ime consumed and wasted prevents the 
timely dispatch of business in the courts.”
132
  A court requires “[s]ome 
degree of finality” to move a case towards its conclusion and “prevent 
endless piecemeal litigation.”
133
  Thus, the court’s interest in judicial 
economy is typically served by preserving its judgment.
 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gave substantial weight to the 
interest of judicial economy in United States v. Dickerson.  There, the 
district court found defendant’s testimony more credible than the 
testifying officer and suppressed the defendant’s confession because it 
was obtained in violation of the Miranda rule.
134
  The prosecution then 
moved for the court to reconsider its ruling, appending affidavits from 
other law enforcement personnel who were present at the time of 
defendant’s statement.
135
  The prosecution explained that it had not 
                                                          
 131.  See supra notes 88–102 and accompanying text. 
 132.  Hacker v. State, 483 P.2d 484, 485 (Kan. 1971). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000). 
 135.  Id. at 676. 
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introduced these affidavits at the initial hearing because it did not expect 
the court to disbelieve its witness and because it did not want to present 
cumulative evidence.
136
  The district court refused the additional 
evidence and denied this motion for reconsideration.
137
  In holding that 
the district court had not abused its discretion, the Dickerson court stated 




The district court properly denied the motion to reconsider when the 
prosecution had already been given multiple opportunities to present its 
evidence.
139
  Not only had the proffered affidavits been available at the 
time of the initial hearing, but the prosecution had also been allowed to 
supplement its initial memorandum twice before the court ruled.
140
  
Because of the “ample opportunities” afforded to the prosecution to 




Echoes of Dickerson’s reasoning are found in the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s Gibson opinion, although here applied to the defendant rather 
than prosecution: 
We have held that a defendant may testify at a [suppression] 
hearing . . . .  But we have not held that a defendant has a right to 
testify regarding suppression whenever he or she sees fit after twice 
giving up that opportunity at a prior hearing. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  This is not a case in which refusal to reopen the suppression 
hearing actually denied Gibson the opportunity to testify.  Gibson 
declined the opportunity in the regular course of the . . . hearing and 
then about 4 months later simply changed his mind.
142
 
When a party fails to present all available evidence at an initial 
suppression hearing, proffering it in a motion for reconsideration may 
simply be too late. 
It is within a district court’s discretion to refuse reconsideration on 
                                                          
 136.  Id. at 678. 
 137.  Id. at 677. 
 138.  Id. at 679. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  State v. Gibson, 322 P.3d 389, 399 (Kan. 2014) (citations omitted). 
2016] MOTION TO RECONSIDER A SUPPRESSION RULING 1201 
 
grounds of judicial economy.  This ability stems from the court’s 
inherent power over its own docket.
143
  A district court may, for instance, 
set reasonable restrictions on motion filing to prevent strain on the 
court’s resources.
144
  Or a court may summarily dismiss motions that are 
repetitious or make unsupported allegations.
145
  The Gibson court held, in 
part, that summarily dismissing the motion to reconsider when defendant 




Thus, the court’s interest in judicial economy will weigh most 
strongly against reconsideration when a motion is duplicative or proffers 
evidence the party had failed to present at an initial hearing.  To best 
serve the court’s interest in avoiding piecemeal legislation, a party 
should present all relevant evidence in its possession at the first 
opportunity. 
In one narrow instance, the court’s interest in economy may weigh in 
favor of reconsideration.  The prosecution has the right to file an 
interlocutory appeal on an adverse ruling, which will stay proceedings 
until a higher court reviews the issue.
147
  This will likely cause a greater 
delay than if the district court itself reconsidered its motion.  Therefore, 
when the prosecution files for reconsideration alleging an error of law or 
error of fact—that is, proffers no additional evidence—the court’s 
interest in judicial economy may weigh in favor of reconsidering the 
motion to prevent the greater delay of an interlocutory appeal. 
3. Threat of Unfair Prejudice to the Nonmovant 
The third broad interest a district court should consider when 
exercising its discretion is the nonmovant’s interest in unfair prejudice.  
Because prejudice will not occur until a district court acts, the district 
court should assess the threat of prejudice upon receiving a motion for 
reconsideration.  This threat may not always be present, but when it is, it 
will strongly weigh against reconsideration. 
The district court should look for more than mere prejudice.  After 
all, prejudice legally speaking is synonymous with harm.
148
  A party 
                                                          
 143.  Holt v. State, 232 P.3d 848, 853 (Kan. 2010). 
 144.  Id. at 855. 
 145.  Hacker v. State, 483 P.2d 484, 485 (Kan. 1971). 
 146.  Gibson, 322 P.3d at 399. 
 147.  See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 148.  BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 699 (3d ed. 2011). 
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required to defend a successful motion for a second time is certainly 
harmed, if only because resources are consumed and the favorable ruling 
may be overturned.  There must be a measure of unfairness to give 
weight to this interest.
149
  Unfair prejudice will be found in two 
situations: when the moving party has manipulated the judicial process to 
gain an advantage or when the motion to reopen surprises the nonmoving 
party. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kithcart 
found prejudice to be the weightiest interest at stake: “[T]he district 
court’s primary focus should be on whether the party opposing reopening 
would be prejudiced if reopening is permitted.”
150
  Kithcart presents a 
different procedural stance from the cases so far examined in this 
Comment, with a suppression ruling being reviewed for the second time.  
At an initial suppression hearing, the district court had admitted a gun 
found after a traffic stop.
151
  The defendant pleaded guilty but appealed 
the suppression ruling.
152
  On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the 
district court’s ruling, holding that the evidence had been gathered 
without probable cause because of a too-general description of the 
suspects and their car.
153
  The appellate court, however, remanded for a 
determination of whether the evidence should be admitted under a 
reasonable-suspicion standard.
154
  On remand, the district court reopened 
the hearing and allowed the prosecution to supplement its testimony.
155
  
The district court again ruled in favor of the prosecution, and a second 
appeal of the ruling followed.
156
  At issue on appeal was whether the 
district court had abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to 
present additional evidence. 
Allowing additional evidence was an abuse of the district court’s 
discretion.
157
  The prosecution had tailored its evidence to meet the prior 
written opinion.
158
  The additional evidence “neatly spackled over each 
                                                          
 149.  Cf. FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating that any evidence may be inadmissible when the probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). 
 150.  United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
 151.  Id. at 217. 
 152.  Id. at 215. 
 153.  Id. at 216–17. 
 154.  Id. at 217. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 219. 
 157.  Id. at 222. 
 158.  Id. at 218 (“Not surprisingly, the government’s new testimony nicely filled the lacunae of 
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of the cracks in the foundation of proof that we pointed out” on the first 
appeal.
159
  When the prosecution should have known what it needed to 
prove at the first hearing, this was, in the Third Circuit’s opinion, an 
unfair “second . . . bite of the . . . apple.”
160
 
Likewise, in State v. Parry, the Kansas Court of Appeals found that 
the prosecution had manipulated the legal process to take “an 
impermissible second bite at the apple.”
161
  There the prosecution, after 
adverse rulings at the suppression hearing and its interlocutory appeal, 
dismissed its case before trial but immediately refiled the charges.
162
  At 
the suppression hearing in the refiled case, the prosecution argued a 
different underlying theory for the legality of its search.
163
  The court 
held that the prosecution was barred from relitigating the issue when the 
prosecution had a prior opportunity to make all its arguments.
164
 
Although the ruling in Parry did not involve a district court’s 
reconsideration, it foregrounds concerns about a losing party taking a 
“do-over” to “assert arguments it failed to raise during the first 
hearing.”
165
  Courts view this as simply unfair to the opposing party and 
a misuse of the legal process.  In these decisions, courts considered 
whether the party requesting the “do-over” had always possessed the 
evidence and knew, or should have known, what evidence needed to be 
proved to win on the suppression hearing.  When that is so, allowing 
reconsideration on the same issue is unfairly prejudicial to the 
nonmovant. 
The second type of unfair prejudice is found when the motion for 
reconsideration surprises the nonmovant.  Generally, the nonmoving 
party should be given adequate notice and opportunity to respond to any 
newly produced evidence or arguments.  In Ozuna, for example, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when, after ruling against the 
prosecution, it allowed the prosecution to present expert handwriting 
analysis of a disputed consent form because the defendant was able to 
call his own handwriting expert and to cross-examine the prosecution’s 
                                                          
the first hearing.”) 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 220–21 (quoting United States v. Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 161.  State v. Parry, 358 P.3d 101, 102  (Kan. Ct. App. 2015). 
 162.  Id. at 103. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 104. 
 165.  Id.  




  Although the defendant was prejudiced by having an 
unfavorable ruling overturned, the defendant had adequate opportunity to 
respond to the new evidence. 
The nonmoving party is also not unfairly prejudiced when the 
movant supplements with evidence that the nonmoving party was already 
aware of.  In State v. Murdock, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed 
whether a district court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
prosecution to reopen its case in chief.
167
  The court held that the district 
court had not abused its discretion.
168
  “It cannot be said that the 
defendant was surprised” when the additional testimony had been 
presented at a preliminary hearing and defendant had prepared his case 
accordingly.
169
  Thus, prejudice through surprise is not unfair when the 
nonmovant has adequate time to prepare to meet supplemental evidence 
or when the nonmovant has prior knowledge of the supplemental 
evidence. 
A defendant will more often be threatened with unfair prejudice than 
the prosecution.  First, a district court decides whether or not to suppress 
evidence based on the conduct of police officers and investigators.  The 
defendant may not have full knowledge of police action before the 
suppression hearing; the defendant may not have full knowledge before 
witnesses have been presented at trial.
170
  The prosecution, on the other 
hand, has access to all the witnesses necessary to justify its evidence 
gathering.
171
  Kansas statutes implicitly acknowledge this by allowing the 
defendant—but not the prosecution—to move for suppression during 
trial when “the defendant was not aware of the ground for the motion” 
before trial.
172
  Second, with an indigent defendant and appointed 
attorney, “it would blink reality to ignore the disparate position of the 
state and the accused before trial.”
173
  The prosecution will frequently 
have more resources and more experienced attorneys.  Because of the 
disparity in information and resources, the defendant is more likely to be 
unfairly prejudiced by a motion for reconsideration.  A district court may 
therefore weigh the threat of unfair prejudice more strongly against 
                                                          
 166.  United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 167.  State v. Murdock, 187 P.3d 1267 (Kan. 2008). 
 168.  Id. at 1277. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3215(6), 3216(3) (2007). 
 173.  McRae, 420 F.2d at 1287. 
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motions for reconsideration submitted by the prosecution. 
When there is a grave threat of unfair prejudice, the district court 
should ensure that the threat is not realized.  This may mean per se 
dismissal of such a motion without consideration of its merits.  The 
district court has arrived at one of Professor Rosenberg’s fenced-off 
areas of the discretionary pasture.  A district court’s grazing can be 
further informed by looking for other areas that are out of bounds. 
B. The Boundaries of Discretion 
This Comment now searches for the outer bounds of a district court’s 
discretion.  As Professor Rosenberg’s pastoral analogy suggests, this is 
easiest to do negatively by finding areas that have been “fenced off” and 
are now out of discretionary bounds.  In such territory, the district court 
has no decision-liberating discretion.  To avoid an abuse, the motion 
must be granted or denied.  The first and second inquiries investigate 
whether a motion may be granted that does not implicate society’s 
interest in an accurate determination.  The third inquiry asks whether the 
combined interests of judicial economy and avoiding unfair prejudice are 
so weighty that the court will not accept supplementary evidence without 
a reasonable justification from the movant. 
1. May the Movant Argue a New Legal Basis for Suppression? 
Generally, a party moving for reconsideration may not argue a new 
legal theory for suppression.  A district court may summarily dismiss 
such a motion.  Dismissal serves the interests of both judicial economy 
(avoiding piecemeal legislation) and threat of unfairness to the 
nonmoving party (the “do-over” rule).  These two interests combine to 
outweigh society’s interest in an accurate determination.  As an 
exception to this general rule, however, a party may move for 
reconsideration on the basis that the court’s ruling misinterpreted the law 
or facts.  This too serves the interest of judicial economy by allowing the 
district court to correct its own error. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s opinion in United States v. 
Thompson illustrates the general rule nicely.  At the suppression hearing, 
the prosecution argued that their search of a small sailboat was 
performed legally pursuant to an authorized document and safety 




  The district court, however, granted defendants’ motion 
and suppressed the marijuana that had been seized.
175
  The prosecution 
then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the marijuana had 
been seized legally pursuant to a search on reasonable suspicion of 
illegal activity.
176
  The district court declined to consider this new legal 
basis for the search.
177
 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial: “[B]y 
failing to raise the issue at the suppression hearing without offering any 
justification therefor, the government waived its right to assert it in 
subsequent proceedings.”
178
  Thus, a party who omits arguments at a 
suppression hearing will not be allowed to submit them in a motion for 
reconsideration.  The threat of unfair prejudice and drain on judicial 
resources outweigh any benefit of an accurate determination.  The 
district court has no discretion; the scales balance in only one direction—
against reconsideration. 
A distinction must be made, however, between arguing a new legal 
basis and arguing that the district court erred in interpreting the legal 
basis presented.  If the district court’s ruling is based on an error of law, 
then the court has categorically abused its discretion.  In that event, 
because the ruling is bound to be overturned on appeal, the interest of 
judicial economy would weigh in favor of reconsideration, as discussed 
in the following section. 
2. Must the Movant Proffer Additional Evidence? 
In State v. Jackson, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that “if at trial 
new or additional evidence is produced bearing on the issue or 
substantially affecting the credibility of the evidence adduced at the 
pretrial hearing . . . we believe the statute authorizes reentertainment of 
the [suppression] motion in the court’s discretion.”
179
  This suggests that 
new or additional relevant evidence is a per se requirement before a 
district court has discretion to reconsider its prior suppression ruling.  
But this would be an incorrect conclusion.  A district court may 
reconsider its own prior ruling even when the movant proffers no new or 
                                                          
 174.  United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 1504. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  State v. Jackson, 515 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Kan. 1973). 
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additional evidence.  A district court has abused its discretion when 
“judicial action was . . . based on an error of law . . . or . . . based on an 
error of fact.”
180
  If either type of error is brought to the district court’s 
attention, the court should overturn its own decision. 
Jackson illustrates a possible error of fact.  Before trial an 
administrative judge had denied defendant’s motion to suppress various 
car keys taken from defendant’s pocket.
181
  Twice during trial the defense 
renewed its motion to suppress.
182
  The court questioned the arresting 
officer outside the presence of the jury but denied the renewed motion.
183
  
Then, during jury deliberations, the district court reversed the 




The Kansas Supreme Court held that this last minute reversal was 
not an abuse of the court’s discretion.  “Normally . . . the motion, when 
made before trial, will be heard once and disposed of; however, if at trial 
new or additional evidence is produced . . . we believe . . . 
reentertainment of the motion [is] in the court’s discretion.”
185
  Even 
though the Jackson opinion does not reveal what, if any, new or 
additional evidence was produced, the court approved the district court’s 
reconsideration on the grounds that a district court must be able to 
correct its own error.
186
 
The Kansas Supreme Court reiterated its Jackson opinion fifteen 
years later in State v. Riedel, which concerns an error of law.  Although 
Riedel does not concern reconsideration of a suppression ruling, the issue 
was closely analogous—reconsideration of a pre-trial ruling on prior 
conviction evidence.  In Riedel, the district court granted prosecution’s 
motion to admit defendant’s expunged conviction on the grounds that the 
prior conviction would go to prove knowledge, intent, or absence of 
mistake, which the judge considered to be an element of the case.
187
  This 
was a mistake of law; the judge had misunderstood the elements of the 
charged offense and misapplied a statutory exception for character 
                                                          
 180.  State v. Gibson, 322 P.3d 389, 398 (citing State v. McCullough, 270 P.3d 1142, 1154–55 
(Kan. 2012)). 
 181.  Jackson, 515 P.2d at 1110. 
 182.  Id. at 1111. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 1110. 
 185.  Id. at 1114. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  State v. Riedel, 752 P.2d 115, 117 (Kan. 1988). 




  When the case was reassigned to a new judge, defendant 
moved for reconsideration pointing out the error of law.
189
  The new 




The Kansas Supreme Court held that reconsideration was not an 
abuse of discretion even though the defendant had proffered no new 
evidence.  “[The new judge] was placed in the position of either 
accepting [the first judge’s] ruling, and perhaps allowing inadmissible 
evidence to be presented to the jury, or making an independent 
decision . . . .”
191
  That additional evidence is not a prerequisite to 
reconsideration follows clearly from the proposition that a district court 
should correct an error brought to its attention.  “[T]o interpret otherwise 
would be to proscribe correction of its own error . . . .”
192
 
Encouraging—perhaps requiring—a district court to correct its own 
error serves the interest of judicial economy.  If a district court comes to 
believe its prior ruling was incorrect, it need not complete the trial, only 
to have the trial outcome overturned on appeal.  Society’s interest in an 
accurate determination will eventually be fulfilled, and there is little 
threat of unfair prejudice to the nonmovant when no new evidence is 
proffered.  The district court should correct itself when a party moving 
for reconsideration convinces the court that its prior ruling was faulty, 
based on the arguments already presented at a suppression hearing.  In 
such a case, it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to overrule itself 
summarily. 
Although a motion that does not proffer new or additional evidence 
is therefore not necessarily outside the discretionary pasture, the motion 
should make a substantial argument that the ruling was in error.  
Certainly, if a party moves for reconsideration without proffering 
additional evidence “material to the issues or substantially affect[ing] the 
credibility of the evidence”
193
 or arguing legal or factual error, the district 
court should dismiss the motion summarily. 
                                                          
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. at 118. 
 192.  Id. (quoting State v. Jackson, 515 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Kan. 1973)). 
 193.  State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406, 422 (Kan. 2004). 
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3.  Must the Movant Provide a Reasonable Justification? 
When the movant does offer supplemental evidence or testimony in 
its motion for reconsideration, some courts hold that it is an abuse of 
discretion for the district court to consider that motion without first 
finding a reasonable and adequate justification to do so.  The First, Third, 
Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals require this 
threshold justification before a district court may consider the merits of 
the motion.
194
  “In order to properly exercise its discretion the district 
court must evaluate [the movant’s] explanation and determine if it is both 
reasonable, and adequate to explain why the [movant] initially failed to 
introduce evidence that may have been essential to meeting its burden of 
proof.”
195
  Because an error of fact or law is per se an abuse of discretion 
and will usually not require additional evidence, the justification 
requirement is an interpretation of the unreasonable prong of abuse of 
discretion.  That is, no reasonable district court would allow the movant 
to produce additional evidence without first providing a reasonable 
justification. 
In their decisions, these circuit courts have focused on different 
interests to arrive at the justification requirement.  The D.C. Circuit 
emphasized the court’s interest: disallowing reconsideration “promote[s] 
judicial efficiency by insuring that trials will not be interrupted or 
delayed by tangential inquiries into the propriety of police conduct.”
196
  
The Third Circuit, however, held that the threat of unfair prejudice to the 
nonmovant should be the “district court’s primary focus.”
197
  Among 
these circuit courts, society’s interest in an accurate determination is a 
subsidiary consideration. 
The Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits reason 
that evidence should be excluded only when a constitutional violation 
has occurred.
198
  Society’s interest in an accurate determination generally 
                                                          
 194.  United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213 
(3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 1995); McRae v. 
United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 195.  Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 220. 
 196.  McRae, 420 F.2d at 1288. 
 197.  Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 220 (quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 740 (6th 
Cir. 1985)). 
 198.  United States v. Huff, 782 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 537; United 
States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. 
Africa, 552 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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outweighs other interests.  These circuits hold that justification for failure 
to produce adequate evidence, if offered, is only a factor for the district 
court to consider in its discretionary decision making.
199
 
The Kansas Supreme Court has not required a reasonable and 
adequate justification before a district court may consider the merits of a 
motion to reconsider.  In State v. Murdock, however, the court instituted 
a threshold justification requirement in an analogous circumstance.
200
  A 
party who moves to reopen its case-in-chief after resting at trial must 
offer a reasonable justification; until the justification has been offered 
and accepted, the court has no discretion to grant the motion.
201
  The 
court based its decision on the threat of unfair prejudice to the 
nonmovant, and in particular the threat of surprise at trial: 
One of the critical factors in evaluating prejudice is the timing of the 
motion . . . .  If . . . the opposing party will have an opportunity to 
respond and attempt to rebut the evidence introduced after reopening, it 
is not nearly as likely to be prejudicial . . . .
202 
The court held in the instant case that the defendant was not significantly 
prejudiced because the prosecution had moved to reopen before the 
defendant had offered any evidence and the omitted testimony was 
expected by the defendant.
203
  Under these circumstances, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion to reopen the trial when the prosecution 
offered the justification of simple oversight.
204
 
The sufficiency of a Murdock requirement has been assessed in only 
one other case, State v. Brown.
205
  There, the district court was similarly 
satisfied with a justification of “oversight” when the omitted evidence 
was already evident from circumstantial evidence and the defendant had 
the opportunity to respond and rebut.
206
  The Murdock and Brown 
opinions show that the Kansas Supreme Court relates the stringency of 
the justification requirement to the merits of the motion to reopen.  This 
is a much more flexible and lenient justification requirement than that 
used by several of the Federal Circuit Courts.  The First Circuit Court of 
                                                          
 199.  E.g., Ozuna, 561 F.3d at 734. 
 200.  State v. Murdock, 187 P.3d 1267, 1275 (Kan. 2008). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. at 1276 (quoting Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741). 
 203.  Id. at 1277. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977, 994 (Kan. 2012). 
 206.  Brown, 284 P.3d at 997. 
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Appeals, for instance, allows reconsideration of a suppression motion in 
only three circumstances: newly discovered evidence, an intervening 
change in the law, or demonstration of an error of law.
207 
Even a flexible or lenient justification requirement, such as the 
Murdock requirement, should not be mandatory before a district court 
can consider the merits of a motion to reconsider.  Reopening a case-in-
chief is not identical to the reopening of a pre-trial hearing.  First, the 
threat of unfair prejudice can be mitigated more easily before trial.  If the 
nonmovant is confronted with new evidence, the district court can grant a 
continuance.  Second, rehearing a motion before trial may disrupt a 
court’s docket.  But the interruption of trial to reopen a case-in-chief is 
likely to affect additional parties, such as an empaneled jury, and 
consume far greater judicial resources.  Finally, a flexible and lenient 
justification requirement is likely to be overcome by a pro forma 
statement of “oversight.”  Such a requirement will not assist the court in 
balancing the interests of an accurate determination, judicial economy, 
and unfair prejudice. 
C. Factors to Consider When Exercising Discretion 
The district court’s discretionary decision to reconsider a suppression 
ruling should be based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.
208
  
“[T]he superiority of [the] nether position,” that is, direct knowledge of 
the facts and parties before it, is the most compelling reason district 
courts are allowed discretion.
209
  “It is not that he knows more than his 
loftier brothers; rather, he sees more and senses more.”
210
  The district 
court should come to its reasoned decision based upon all the data 
available to it, both argued in the motion for reconsideration and all that 
has come before.  This broad “facts and circumstances” recommendation 
can, however, be refined by describing the more common and relevant 
factors a district court may expect to consider when exercising its 
discretion.  The court should always keep in mind the relation among the 
following factors and the interests of an accurate determination, judicial 
economy, and avoiding unfair prejudice. 
                                                          
 207.  United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 208.  United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 735 (7th Cir. 2009); State v. Bozung, 245 P.3d 739, 
743 (Utah 2011); see Murdock, 187 P.3d at 1276 (recommending specific factors for a district court 
to consider on motion to reopen a case-in-chief but recognizing that “unique circumstances” may 
control another case). 
 209.  Judicial Discretion, supra note 31, at 663; see supra notes 32–45 and accompanying text. 
 210.  Judicial Discretion, supra note 31, at 663. 
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1. Additional Evidence 
Society’s interest in an accurate determination of whether a 
constitutional violation occurred is advanced directly by consideration of 
all relevant evidence.  Although additional evidence need not be 
proffered in a motion for reconsideration,
211
 a motion to reconsider that 
does not supplement the evidentiary record will not succeed without a 
convincing argument that the district court made an error of fact or error 
of law.  The proffer of additional evidence—and the adequacy of that 
evidence—is likely to be the key factor in a district court’s decision on 
reconsideration. 
Immaterial, irrelevant, and already presented evidence does not 
further society’s interest because it does not help the district court make a 
more accurate determination.  The court’s interest in efficiency justifies 
summarily dismissing a motion that fails to present evidence “bearing on 
the issue or substantially affecting the credibility of the evidence adduced 
at the pretrial hearing.”
212
  Simply recharacterizing evidence or 
rephrasing testimony already presented is an inadequate proffer.
213
  
Unsupported speculation or legal conclusions are also unhelpful to the 
district court.  A motion for reconsideration must do more than address 
an already settled issue in greater detail.
214
  Although evidence presented 
at a suppression hearing need not be admissible at trial,
215
 the district 
court may consider whether any proffered evidence itself was obtained 
legally or is otherwise admissible.  Finally, a movant who proffers 
evidence already in its possession at the suppression hearing may find its 
proffer refused.
216
  Although such evidence does implicate society’s 
interest, the district court may still dismiss on grounds of judicial 
economy, that the movant has created an unnecessary delay by not 
presenting all its evidence in the first instance.
217 
                                                          
 211.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 212.  State v. Jackson, 515 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Kan. 1973). 
 213.  McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[T]he Government should 
not be permitted . . . to present the same witness to a second judge in the hopes that a differently 
phrased narration of the relevant circumstances will lead to a different ruling.”). 
 214.  State v. Holmes, 102 P.3d 406, 422 (Kan. 2004). 
 215.  RINGEL, supra note 75, § 20:15. 
 216.  United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 679 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000); State v. Gibson, 322 P.3d 389, 399 (Kan. 2014). 
 217.  See supra Part III.A.2 discussing judicial economy regarding evidence in possession but 
withheld. 
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2. Timeliness of the Motion 
The timeliness of a motion bears on the court’s interest in judicial 
economy and the threat of unfair prejudice to the nonmovant.  This can 
be measured from either of two points: the time after the court’s initial 
suppression ruling or the time before trial begins.  As the ruling recedes 
or trial approaches, both interests weigh more greatly against 
reconsideration, whereas the relative weight of society’s interest in an 
accurate determination remains constant. 
The length of time after entry of the order granting or denying 
suppression is related to unfair prejudice.  A significant delay may 
indicate improper motive for filing, such as an attempt to burden or 
surprise the nonmovant.  In any case, the nonmovant must be allowed 
time to respond to the motion at least on paper.  As trial approaches, both 
the court’s interest and the threat of unfair prejudice increase.  They 
increase dramatically after trial has begun because of the involvement of 
other parties, such as jurors, court staff, and members of the public. 
When considering timeliness, the district court should recognize that 
the prosecution and defendant are not equally situated.  First, the 
defendant has a statutory right to move for suppression at trial if 
“opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the 
ground for the motion.”
218
  Second, the defendant is more likely to find 
new grounds for suppression as proceedings progress.
219
  When evidence 
has been ruled admissible, the investigating officers will likely testify 
and be cross-examined at trial.  The defendant then has a chance to verify 
the facts and probe for inconsistencies.  When evidence has been 
suppressed, however, it will not appear at trial and no new evidence will 
arise. 
The district court does retain discretion to entertain all motions for 
reconsideration at trial.
220
  This allows the court to protect society’s 
interest.  However, a motion presented at trial should present a 
compelling case for why society’s interest counterbalances the interests 
of judicial economy and unfair prejudice. 
                                                          
 218.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3215(6), 3216(3) (2007). 
 219.  McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see supra notes 107–09, 
169–72 and accompanying text. 
 220.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3215(6), 3216(3) (2007). 
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3. Reasonable Justification 
An adequate and reasonable justification should not be a threshold 
requirement for a district court to entertain a motion for reconsideration.  
A strict requirement gives too little weight to society’s interest, but a 
lenient requirement tends towards irrelevance.
221
  The court may, 
however, look at any justification offered as part of the complete facts 
and circumstances to be considered.  Here, the district court should 
watch out in particular for threats of unfair prejudice to the nonmovant.  
Simple oversight, especially when the nonmovant was aware of the 
omitted evidence, is not a cause of unfair prejudice.
222
  And when the 
court has ruled against a party in a close decision, the movant may 
reasonably submit supplementary evidence it already had in its 
possession.
223
  On the other hand, a motion for reconsideration indicating 
gross negligence, deliberate delay, or abuse of the legal process deserves 
little indulgence. 
4. Nature of the Constitutional Violation Alleged 
The district court may consider the constitutional basis alleged for 
suppression.  The weight accorded society’s interest in an accurate 
determination changes depending on the constitutional grounds and 
whether the movant is the prosecution or defendant.
224
  When a 
defendant’s statements have been ruled voluntary, society’s interest 
weighs relatively more in favor of defendant’s motion for 
reconsideration than the prosecution’s.  When physical evidence has 
been suppressed, society’s interest weighs relatively more in favor of the 
prosecution’s motion than defendant’s. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
This Comment now describes a recommended process that a Kansas 
district court should use when a motion for reconsideration is filed.  As a 
preliminary matter, a court may wish to know whether the initial balance 
                                                          
 221.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 222.  See State v. Murdock, 187 P.3d 1267, 1277 (Kan. 2008). 
 223.  United States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2009); but see United States v. 
Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 678–79 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that prosecution’s withholding of 
evidence because it did not expect to need it was not a reasonable justification), rev’d on other 
grounds, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 224.  See supra note 130 and accompanying paragraph. 
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of the three interests tilts toward or against reconsideration.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court has stated that “[n]ormally . . . the [suppression] motion, 
when made before trial, will be heard once and disposed of.”
225
  This 
appears to show a general disinclination to reconsideration.  However, 
that statement can also be read as a simpler observation—that most 
suppression rulings are not challenged by a motion to reconsider.  The 
best approach is that district courts accept a motion to reconsider with the 
scales level: society’s interest precisely balanced by the combined weight 
of judicial economy and threat of unfair prejudice.  From that starting 
point, the district court follows the steps laid out below. 
First, does the motion argue for suppression on a new legal theory 
not advanced at the suppression hearing?  If so, the motion should be 
summarily dismissed.  Because legal bases not argued are waived, the 
district court has no discretion to hear this motion.  If not, proceed. 
Second, does the motion argue persuasively that the court’s ruling is 
an abuse of discretion because of an error of law or an error of fact?  If 
so, the motion should be granted.  A district court must correct its own 
error when it can.  Before ruling, the district court may allow the 
nonmovant to respond in person or through supplemental briefs.  It is 
unlikely, however, that the court will need to reopen the hearing to take 
additional testimony or evidence. 
Third, does the motion proffer additional evidence “bearing on the 
issue or substantially affecting the credibility of the evidence adduced at 
the pretrial hearing” so that there is a substantial possibility of changing 
the outcome?
226
  If not, the motion is repetitive, immaterial, irrelevant, or 
insufficient and should be dismissed. 
If the motion does proffer adequate additional evidence, then the 
district court should consider the totality of the facts and circumstances 
presented with specific reference to the balance among society’s interest, 
the court’s interest, and the nonmovant’s interest.  As nonexclusive 
factors, the court should consider the additional evidence proffered, the 
timeliness of the motion, any justification offered by the movant, and the 
nature of the alleged constitutional violation.  The hearing may be 
reopened for the presentation of evidence, testimony, and argument.  
When the court has made its decision, the court must state on the record 
or in a written order the reasons for its ruling in order to provide an 
adequate record for later review.  If this procedure has been followed, 
                                                          
 225.  State v. Jackson, 515 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Kan. 1973). 
 226.  Id. 
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however, the district court has not only protected society’s and the 
parties’ interests, but it also should have protected itself from reversal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In State v. Gibson, the Kansas Supreme Court announced that 
district-court action on a motion for reconsideration of a suppression 
hearing would be reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Gibson was directed 
to appellate courts.  It gave those courts a review standard.  However, 
Gibson did not tell district courts how they should exercise discretion.  
This Comment has proposed a method for doing so. 
To exercise discretion on a motion for reconsideration, district courts 
should balance three broad interests: society’s interest in an accurate 
determination of whether a constitutional violation occurred; the court’s 
interest in judicial economy; and the threat of unfair prejudice to the 
nonmovant.  The court should generally look to all the facts and 
circumstances in relation to these interests.  Among the more common 
and significant circumstances presented will be the additional evidence 
proffered, the timeliness of the motion, the reason given for the motion, 
and the nature of the issue presented.  A district court whose ruling is 
based on these factors and a balance of the interests will not abuse its 
discretion. 
 
